Over the weekend, less than two weeks after Iran and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to end hostilities, the countries exchanged multiple attacks. Iran fired at a ship crossing the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. shot at Iranian missile and drone sites, then both sides launched more strikes while claiming retaliation for the other violating the ceasefire. A meeting between the two countries was called off, though the White House now says there will be new meetings in Qatar.
This isn’t a return to full-scale war, but it isn’t peace either. It is a new phase in the conflict: the fight to control Hormuz. The United States already lost the fight Trump started; it failed to achieve his declared goal of the Iranian regime’s unconditional surrender, or, barring that, Tehran’s acceptance of stringent nuclear restrictions. Now the conflict is over whether Iran controls Hormuz and can charge fees, or if the U.S. can restore the pre-war status quo, with ships transiting freely.
The U.S.-accepted language doesn’t officially acknowledge Iranian control of Hormuz, but, if anything, it favors Tehran’s interpretation.
The two sides are making incompatible claims about the MOU’s contents. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that under the agreement, Iran has sole responsibility for the strait. Meanwhile, the Trump administration asserts that the U.S. will not allow Iran to “illegally control an international waterway.”
The MOU itself is ambiguous enough to allow for either interpretation. But that’s the problem: this core issue was never worked out. The MOU was essentially a negotiated agreement to negotiate an agreement, punting all major points of contention to future talks.
Article 5 of the MOU says “the traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start” and “Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage” but doesn’t say if those arrangements can include tolls. Beyond that, all the MOU does is require Iran to talk with Oman “to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz” while recognizing “the sovereign rights of coastal states.”
The U.S.-accepted language doesn’t officially acknowledge Iranian control of Hormuz, but, if anything, it favors Tehran’s interpretation. Professional diplomats would have demanded more specifics, including on the limits of coastal sovereignty over what has long been treated as an international waterway. But the U.S. negotiating team was led by an inexperienced vice president (JD Vance), the president’s son-in-law (Jared Kushner), and a real estate investor (Steve Witkoff). Perhaps they thought they could use the ambiguity to their advantage, or that any language was worth getting something they could call a deal. Whatever their logic, agreeing to this text set up the fight for Hormuz.
Iran is treating control of Hormuz as a spoil of a successful defensive war. After surviving the initial U.S.-Israeli assault and demonstrating that its military can block Hormuz despite U.S. efforts to prevent it, the Iranian government has consistently asserted that it will control the strait. Last month, Iran set up something called the Persian Gulf Strait Authority and told ships they’ll have to register and sign up for a mandatory insurance policy (which sounds like a euphemism for tolls).
Neither side looks interested in reigniting the high-intensity warfare that ended with a provisional ceasefire on April 8. But they’re still asserting incompatible claims over the strait.
Meanwhile, the United States is acting as if it’s still the predominant military force in the Persian Gulf, as if the war didn’t alter the regional power structure. Trump has been declaring Hormuz totally open and free, and lying that Iran agreed to it. Gulf Arab states are saying they won’t pay tolls. After the signing of the MOU, a stream of ships began exiting the Gulf via a route hugging Oman, known to be clear of Iranian mines. But the vessels are still within easy range for Iranian missiles and drones, as shown by the Iranian attack on a merchant vessel Thursday that kicked off the weekend’s exchanges of fire.
If ships can use this route without registering with the Iranian government, it will establish a corridor through Hormuz outside Iran’s control. That would effectively surrender Iran’s claims to sovereignty over the strait and erase most of Iran’s longer-term geopolitical and economic gains from the war, making this a put-up-or-shut-up moment for the Iranian regime and especially its Revolutionary Guard. That points towards further escalation.
Neither side looks interested in reigniting the high-intensity warfare that ended with a provisional ceasefire on April 8. But they’re still asserting incompatible claims over the strait, so there will likely be further military exchanges.
Maybe Iran re-establishes enough of a threat, including over the Oman corridor, that ships won’t risk transit. But that would undo the MOU, which in practical terms means economic benefits for Iran in exchange for allowing ships in and out of Hormuz. Iran is already enjoying the removal of the naval blockade the U.S. imposed in April and waivers for U.S. sanctions, thereby facilitating the sale of Iranian oil. They want other economic benefits the MOU promises, but they likely want the strategic and economic benefits of controlling Hormuz more.
And time is on Iran’s side. Disrupted shipping in the Gulf harms the global economy, and the bigger the economic damage, the more that the U.S. attacking Iran becomes a cautionary tale. For now, countries and companies are covering the oil shortfall by drawing down reserves, but reserves are running out.
Fear of a big energy market disruption, when daily oil demand increasingly exceeds available supply, was a main reason Trump surrendered to Iran in the first place. At the G7 summit on June 17, Trump said, “We run out of reserves at about four weeks.” That would put the deadline in mid-July.
Maybe it’s more like August or September, but whatever the deadline, big economic problems will come if oil reserves run out and ships from the Gulf aren’t on the way bringing more. The markets did react positively when shipping began to pick up after the MOU, with oil futures dropping to around pre-war levels. But that won’t last if conditions stagnate or worsen.
Either way, Trump messed up this war so badly that the U.S. aim now is just to get back to something like the pre-war status quo. And at this point, even that looks unachievable.
Nicholas Grossman is a political science professor at the University of Illinois, editor of Arc Digital and the author of “Drones and Terrorism.”
