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Senator Yari’s Dual Role: When a Nigerian Lawmaker Chairs Geregu Power Company
There is a constitutional question embedded in a press statement—and it deserves to be asked plainly. On August 19, 2026, Senator Abdul’aziz Yari Abubakar—a serving senator representing Zamfara West and a widely acknowledged political confidant of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu—issued a public statement in his capacity as Chairman of Geregu Power Plc, one of Nigeria’s publicly listed electricity generation companies. In that statement, he assured investors and bondholders that Geregu Power had fully settled its outstanding bond obligations.
“Our Board is fully committed to meeting Geregu’s financial obligations to its bondholders and trustees,” Senator Yari declared. “I am pleased to confirm that payment has just been effected in line with our obligations.”
He described the settlement as a boost to investor confidence, reaffirmed the board’s support for the Federal Government’s Renewed Hope Agenda, and emphasised Geregu Power’s role in strengthening electricity generation and economic growth.
Economic Confidential observes that in corporate terms, the statement was routine. What makes it remarkable—and the subject of this editorial—is who issued it and in what dual capacity.
Senator Yari did not speak as a passive shareholder. He spoke as Chairman of the Board, the highest position of corporate governance authority in a publicly listed company, while simultaneously serving as a full-time legislator in the Nigerian Senate. Both roles carry constitutional weight. Both impose legal obligations. The question of whether they can be lawfully held by the same individual at the same time is not abstract. It is precise. And the Nigerian Constitution provides a precise answer.
What the Constitution Says
The relevant provision is not hidden in regulatory footnotes. It sits in clear language in Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria—the Code of Conduct for Public Officers.
Section 2(b) states: “A public officer shall not, except where he is not employed on a full-time basis, engage or participate in the management or running of any private business, profession or trade.”
Senator Yari is unquestionably a public officer. Members of the National Assembly are classified as such, remunerated full time by the state, and bound by the Code of Conduct.
The constitutional question is therefore straightforward: Does chairing a listed corporation constitute “participating in the management or running” of a private business?
Most constitutional scholars would answer yes—and the evidence of August 19 makes that answer unavoidable. A board chairman who publicly announces bond settlements, assures investors, characterises corporate strategy and speaks on behalf of the board is not passive. He is exercising governance authority. He is participating in management.
The Constitution does not prohibit public officers from owning shares or receiving dividends. It prohibits management participation. A board chairmanship crosses that line.
The Dissenting Argument—and Its Limits
Some legal practitioners who spoke to the Economic Confidential argue that a non-executive chairman does not “run” a business in the operational sense. Under this view, management refers only to day-to-day administration, not strategic oversight. A non-executive chairman, they claim, governs rather than manages.
It is an arguable position—but it collapses under scrutiny.
First, corporate governance frameworks do not draw a neat line between governance and management. Under the SEC Code of Corporate Governance and the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2020, a board chairman has fiduciary responsibilities: setting board agenda, ensuring board effectiveness, overseeing executive management and representing the company to shareholders and the investing public. These are active functions.
Second, the August 19 statement undermines the non-executive defence. When a sitting senator confirms that “payment has just been effected,” assures bondholders of financial commitments and aligns corporate strategy with federal policy, he is not offering abstract oversight. He is communicating material corporate decisions. That is management.
Third, Senator Yari’s political proximity to the presidency—and Geregu Power’s explicit invocation of the Renewed Hope Agenda—raises conflict of interest concerns that the Code of Conduct exists precisely to prevent. A senator chairing a power company operating in a sector directly shaped by federal policy occupies a constitutionally untenable intersection.
The Conflict-of-Interest Dimension
Nigeria’s power sector is one of the most heavily regulated domains in the economy. The Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) sets tariffs and licensing conditions. The Federal Ministry of Power shapes policy. The Federal Government remains a major stakeholder in national power infrastructure.
Legislative decisions on energy bills, appropriations and regulatory oversight directly affect companies like Geregu Power.
A senator who chairs such a company is not a passive observer. He is a participant—voting on legislation, influencing oversight, engaging with executive officials whose decisions affect the company’s financial performance. The conflict is not hypothetical. It is structural.
The Constitution anticipates this scenario. The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) exist to adjudicate such conflicts. Penalties include removal from office, disqualification from public office for up to ten years and forfeiture of assets derived from the conflicted position.
These are not symbolic sanctions. They reflect the seriousness with which the Constitution separates public duty from private commercial interest.
The Broader Pattern—and the Institutional Question
Senator Yari is not the first Nigerian public officer to straddle legislative office and corporate directorship. The practice is widespread, and enforcement has historically been inconsistent. But inconsistency does not erase constitutional obligation.
What makes this case particularly visible is the combination of factors:nthe public nature of his corporate pronouncements, his political prominence, the strategic sensitivity of the power sector and Geregu Power’s public interest role in electricity supply.
These elements make the constitutional question unavoidable.
The relevant institutions must respond. The Code of Conduct Bureau should assess whether Senator Yari’s chairmanship and public exercise of board authority violate the Fifth Schedule. The National Assembly should clarify whether a serving senator may hold a listed company chairmanship without explicit conflict of interest disclosures and safeguards. And Senator Yari himself owes the public a clear explanation of how he reconciles these roles—or which one he intends to relinquish.
The Constitution’s answer is not ambiguous. The question is whether the institutions charged with upholding it will act.
