August 4, 2024, Dhaka. People celebrated in jubilation after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and left the country. Photo by: Rafi Al Ahnaf (used with permissin.
This post is part of Global Voices’ September 2026 Spotlight series, “Protest in Democracy.” With this Spotlight, we seek to explore the many forms of protest, the tactics states use to delegitimize and suppress them, and the complex relationship between protest and democracy. You can support this coverage by donating here.
Mob violence is on the rise in Bangladesh. According to the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression Irene Khan, unchecked impunity is contributing to the trend. Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a Dhaka-based legal aid and human rights organization, reported in its monthly Statistics of Human Rights Violations that at least 154 people were beaten to death in mob violence across Bangladesh between January and August 2026. ASK compiled the figure from national newspapers, online news outlets and its own documentation.
In Pabna, Bangladesh, 10-year-old Kamrunnahar Koli went missing from her village on September 9, 2026. Her body was recovered from a pond near her home seven days later. Police identified two suspects, arrested them on September 17, and sent them to jail.
But the following day, hundreds of people gathered outside the home of one of the accused and vandalized the property while police were present.
Md Torikul Islam, officer-in-charge of Pabna Sadar Police Station, told The Daily Star that officers tried to control the crowd, but “the small force could not stop such a large mob.” Police removed the suspect’s family members and secured valuables, but, he said, “we could not prevent the structural destruction.”
A broader pattern
The attack came amid a broader pattern documented by rights groups. In its review of the interim government that took office after Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) reported an increasing tendency to take the law into one’s own hands and a growing trend of forming mobs to press demands. In some cases, it said, those demands were met. TIB also pointed to police apathy, reluctance to perform duties and questions over law-enforcement capacity.
The pattern continued after the BNP-majority government took office following the February 2026 parliamentary elections. In its assessment of the government’s first 100 days, TIB reported 69 to 80 incidents of mob violence nationwide during March and April, resulting in between 31 and 42 deaths.
For Bangladeshi broadcast journalist Rifat Alam Risan, the speed at which a crowd can turn against an individual became a personal experience.
In December 2025, Risan went to Dhaka Medical College Hospital to collect footage after political activist and then-independent parliamentary candidate Sharif Osman Bin Hadi had been shot in Dhaka. News reports also documented an attack on Risan while he was gathering news there.
Speaking to Global Voices in person in Dhaka on September 20, 2026, Risan said that the situation changed after someone in the crowd accused him of being involved in Hadi’s shooting.
“Someone said, ‘He shot Hadi, and now he has come back to attack us.’ The accusation spread through the crowd, and people who gathered around began attacking me without any judgment or consideration,” Risan recalled.
“They beat me and forced me out of the hospital. At one point, I collapsed on the road, and they also tried to take my phone. I was eventually rescued by a fellow television reporter and other media workers who were there.”
Speaking to Global Voices by phone on September 20, 2026, Jamal Ruhany, another Bangladeshi broadcast journalist, described a pattern he said he had observed in how a crowd can turn on an individual.
“First, one or two people target a specific person. Once one or two people attack that person, many others nearby join in,” Ruhany said. “The people doing the beating often do not even know whether the person is actually guilty, and the person being attacked may not even know what they are accused of. Someone simply says, ‘Beat him,’ and it happens.”
August 2, 2024. Manik Mia Avenue, Dhaka. Earlier, police had attacked protesters. In response, enraged protesters set fires on the streets. Photo by Rafi Al Ahnaf. Used with permission.
Instigations on social media
Social media can add another layer to the violence.
On April 11, 2026, an old video containing remarks alleged to be offensive to Islam circulated on Facebook before an attack on a Sufi shrine in Kushtia, Bangladesh. The Bangla Daily Prothom Alo reported that the 36-second video was circulated from three Facebook pages and four personal accounts. Police became aware of the possibility of unrest at about 9 a.m. and contacted local leaders. Later that day, more than 100 people attacked the shrine.
Its spiritual leader, Abdur Rahman, also known as Shamim al-Jahangir, was beaten and hacked to death. The shrine was vandalized and set on fire.
Ruhany said mobs do not depend on social media alone.
“It also happens on the ground. When there is a movement, people come into the streets and mobs form there,” he said. “Social media still plays a role, particularly when a religiously offensive post circulates on Facebook and creates anger among people, pushing the situation toward violence.”
The subsequent murder case also raised questions about political affiliations. The victim’s brother filed a case naming four people and another 180 to 200 unidentified suspects. According to the Daily Star, the named accused included a former Kushtia district president of Islami Chhatra Shibir who was also a Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami member, a local Jamaat activist and the local president of Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis. Jamaat representatives denied that their members were involved.
Four days after the killing, police had yet to arrest any of the four named accused. By May 1, however, four suspects had been arrested in connection with the attack.
The Pabna and Kushtia cases unfolded differently. In Pabna, police were already at the scene but said they were outnumbered. In Kushtia, police knew several hours before the attack that unrest was possible. Together, the cases raise questions about both prevention and accountability.
Lack of enforcement of justice
Ruhany linked crowd action partly to perceptions of the justice system.
“People do not have the assurance that they will get justice,” he said. “Judgments are delivered, but they are not always enforced. And the lengthy judicial process also contributes to this.”
His observation is one explanation rather than evidence that everyone involved in mob violence acts for the same reason. Such incidents in Bangladesh have emerged from different circumstances, including criminal accusations, claims of religious offense and attempts to press particular demands.
Ruhany also questioned police preparedness.
“The police no longer have the same morale they had before August 5,” he said. “And in areas where mob violence occurs, the police are often not prepared. We do not see the police maintaining a constant state of preparedness.”
Bangladesh’s reliance on street mobilization did not begin with the 2024 uprising. Rallies, strikes, blockades, and marches have shaped the country’s political life for decades, while ASK’s human rights statistics archive contains records of mob beatings going back more than a decade.
The July 2024 uprising again demonstrated the power of mass street mobilization. After weeks of student-led protests that expanded into a broader movement, then-prime minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and left Bangladesh on August 5.
July 11, 2024, Quota Movement, Shahbagh, Dhaka. Photo by Sabbirul Islam. Used with permission.
But street protest and mob punishment are not the same. The distinction has also appeared in the government’s response. The Home Minister of the current government, Salahuddin Ahmed, said on his first working day in February 2026 that mob action would not be tolerated, while lawful meetings, rallies and other democratic activities could continue.
The issue has also reached the courts. On February 2, 2026, following a public-interest petition filed by ASK, Bangladesh’s High Court asked the government to explain why its failure to prevent and control mob killings and mass beatings should not be declared unlawful. The court also asked why authorities should not be directed to take effective legal measures to prevent such violence.
Six months later, the government was still publicly addressing the problem. In parliament on August 27, Ahmed said the government was following a “zero tolerance” policy toward mob violence. He said punishing or physically assaulting someone without due legal process was illegal and cited measures including increased patrols, intelligence surveillance, CCTV installation and social-media monitoring in areas considered at risk.
In Bangladesh, rights groups continue to record deaths, the High Court has questioned the state’s response, and the government has promised tougher action. Whether those commitments translate into preventing attacks and moving cases from arrest to prosecution remains an open question.
